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Abstract 
Arbitrage and short selling are investment strategies that epitomise a particular mode of 
investment: smart, sophisticated, and efficiency-enhancing (as described within 
mainstream finance). Yet many market events of recent financial history point to a less 
benign face of this practice. Short selling in particular can be associated with 
manipulative strategies that do not add much to the efficiency of the market but rather 
hinder the interests of various categories of market actors, notably long-term investors 
and corporate actors. Despite pointing to important aspects of the capitalist relationships 
created by contemporary financial markets, these topics have gone unnoticed in 
international political economy. This article shows that a political-economy approach to 
arbitrage would provide important insights into the role that financial theories play in the 
formulation of regulatory decisions and into the impact that these decisions have on 
different classes of market actors.  
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Introduction 
In Issue 32(3) of Economy and Society Donald MacKenzie explores the sociology of 
arbitrage. His work touches on one of the most important principles of modern finance 
and a milestone of contemporary investing. MacKenzie’s idea is that a sociological 
approach to arbitrage helps unveil the contradictions in the argument that markets can 
remain efficient, intended as isolated from the turbulences of the social world.1 While 
becoming an increasingly familiar topic and the symbol of a particular mode of investing, 
arbitrage has remained neglected in political science and the subfield of international 
political economy. This article asks whether there is any rationale for a political economy 
of arbitrage and what such an approach would look like. 
 
According to a textbook definition, arbitrage is the act of discerning and profiting from 
current price discrepancies that the market does not incorporate into prices. Such an 
opportunity arises, for instance, when the same security trade at two different prices in 
two different markets. An arbitrageur would buy the cheaper security and sell short the 
more expensive one. Short-selling means selling without the need of owning the shares 
to be sold short. Shares will be borrowed later on to be delivered. A classic example 
would be that of shares of General Motors (GM) selling at $54 per share on the New 
York Stock Exchange and at $56 on the London Stock exchange: arbitrageurs would sell 
short shares in London and buy them in New York, as a result making the stock prices in 
the two locations converge. By so doing, they would ‘earn sure profit without investing a 
penny of [their] own money.2 This is why arbitrage is said to involve no risk and to earn a 
guaranteed profit.  
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In day-to-day market operations, the word ‘arbitrage’ is associated with very diverse 
investment strategies that might be only slightly related to the textbook example. There 
are a myriad of funds performing arbitrage strategies in securities, commodities, and 
bonds markets. The majority of these funds build long positions in assets that are 
expected to grow in value and build short positions in assets that are expected to lose 
value.3 For instance, at the end of 2004 Marks & Spencer was said to have had a difficult 
take-over due to the operation of risk arbitrageurs betting on the success of the deal.4 In 
this case, risk arbitrageurs performed a ‘merger arbitrage’: they bought the shares of the 
acquired company whose price was supposed to rise as a consequence of the deal – and 
which was in this sense ‘undervalued’ – and sold short the shares of the acquiring 
company whose price was supposed to fall and which was for the same logic 
‘overvalued’. Yet another arbitrage strategy is the one performed by ‘vulture funds’,5 so 
called because they buy the debt of distressed companies or countries perhaps at half of 
its nominal value and sell it back later on at or above its full price. The fund that in 1996 
paid $11 million to buy $20 million of Peru’s sovereign debt and that later on sued the 
Peruvian government for full payment plus capitalised interest was a vulture fund.6 
Considering the attention devoted to arbitrage in investor websites, online pundits and 
manuals, the practice is on the increase. 
 
Arbitrage is also a core principle of neoclassical finance since it is essential to its 
assumption of market efficiency. Since arbitrageurs detect and close price discrepancies, 
they are said to drive prices back to their equilibrium level and markets back to efficiency, 
even when the mass of investors is trading in an irrational way. Given that arbitrageurs 
are rational and compete to discover arbitrage opportunities, these opportunities are fast 
disappearing so that prices quickly converge to their fundamental value.  
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Several non-mainstream finance approaches have questioned the theory of arbitrage.7 
Their argument is that arbitrage is unlikely to bring markets back to efficiency because 
investors – even the sophisticated ones or arbitrageurs – do not behave according to the 
model of neoclassical finance. They either herd and imitate or find it more convenient to 
join rather than contrast other investors’ irrationality. These approaches have been 
concerned with disproving the rationality assumption of mainstream finance – especially 
as formulated in the theory of arbitrage – and showing other sociology- and psychology-
based models of investor behaviour.  
 
This article does not focus on the behaviour and rationality of arbitrageurs. Drawing on a 
definition of political economy as the discipline that studies the interactions between 
political and economic processes, the article analyzes the regulatory treatment of 
arbitrage and its impact on different societal interests. These two aspects are interrelated: 
market practices are the result of regulatory decisions and non-decisions. This regulatory 
structure in turn hinders certain interests and benefits others. The theory of arbitrage is 
still very central since regulators have more than often taken on the efficiency argument 
to justify their decisions. In other words, while in day-to-day operations arbitrage might 
not work according to the theory – using MacKenzie’s words, it has a low performativity 
ratio8 – its ability to influence regulatory decisions is still very high. This has 
consequences for the outcome of regulation. In particular, it can favour certain categories 
of investors (e.g. short sellers, market makers) at the expenses of others (e.g. small 
corporate, long term investors).     
 
A caveat is necessary. This article starts with a particular definition of arbitrage. It draws 
on Fama’s seminal work on the theory of arbitrage, which defines arbitrageurs by their 
capacity to sell short, and makes short selling the focus of the analysis. In ‘The Behaviour 
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of Stock-Market Prices’, published in the Journal of Business in 1965, Fama contends that 
the role of arbitrageurs or sophisticated traders is that of offsetting a noise generated 
process (e.g. a price bubble) by acting as market contrarians and that selling short is the 
main instrument of this offsetting strategy.9 Short selling, in other words, is attributed the 
main efficiency-enhancing role in opposing the exuberant expectations of the buying side 
of the market. This argument is dominant among regulators, investors and the press. 
Examples can be found in the commentaries following the bursting of the Internet 
bubble in March 2000, as section four will show.  
 
In addition, amidst the differences in their investment strategies, arbitrageurs are all 
characterised by the (legal) capacity to sell short. While everyone can buy, not everyone 
can sell short. In many countries an investor protection rationale forbids from selling 
short those institutional investors that collect money from the broader public, notably 
mutual and pension funds. The reason is that the maximum amount one can lose in 
buying a stock is the price of the stock, while in the case of short selling losses can be 
theoretically limitless.10  
 
Who benefits from this legal capacity? Hedge funds are among the few investors with 
unrestricted access to short selling. This, coupled with the essence of their trade, which is 
very close to an arbitrage philosophy, has made of them the typical short sellers.11 In the 
late 1990s, many regulatory reforms have relaxed restrictions on short selling for mass 
investors,12 while instruments of short selling have become increasingly available to the 
retail player (e.g. single-stock futures). Yet the equation hedge funds=arbitrageurs is 
usually maintained. The SEC for instance estimates that most of the short selling is done 
by market makers for hedge funds’ accounts.13  
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Now that the topic and focus of the article are outlined, it is necessary to determine the 
interest, from a political economy point of view, of this analysis of arbitrage/short 
selling. In the last 5 to 10 years short selling has become a controversial topic, not least 
because it was at the centre of many episodes of market unrest or manipulation (e.g. 
post-9/11 speculation; naked short-selling abuses). Calls for its regulation or re-
regulation often emerged after a particular market crisis or lawsuit and some regulatory 
initiatives were launched in major financial centres (e.g. US, UK and Japan). Most 
practitioners and regulators, however, have opposed regulation on the ground that short 
selling is a tool of efficiency. If on the one hand there might be reasons to address short 
selling for its (increasingly) manipulative character, on the other hand short selling is seen 
as crucial to an efficient market. The dilemma for regulators lies in this tension between 
the need to protect investors and the need to promote efficiency, which regulators find 
equally constraining. In solving this dilemma, regulators interact with and affect various 
interest groups: in this lies the political interest of the analysis.  
 
The article analyses some short-selling-related events, which have an international 
resonance, and focuses more specifically on the case of the US, where a new rule on 
short selling was introduced in 2004.14 Since 1999 the Securities and Exchange 
Commission (SEC) has been involved in a major revision of short sale regulation in the 
US cash equity markets. A consultation process was launched in which all actors either 
engaged in shorting the market or at the receiving end of short selling were invited to 
contribute. This debate is an exceptional laboratory to assess the beliefs, claims and 
arguments on short selling and its impact in relation to different categories of market 
actors. Methodologically, the article draws on academic contributions, regulatory 
documents, and interviews with both practitioners and regulators.  
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The article is organised in four sections. Sections one to three review the current 
approaches to the study of arbitrage in neoclassical finance, behavioural finance and 
sociology respectively. Section four identifies a political economy approach by focusing 
on the regulatory attitude towards short selling at both the domestic and international 
level. Section five draws some concluding remarks and outlines the agenda for future 
research on the political economy of short selling. 
 
 
1. The mainstream finance approach to arbitrage 
Arbitrage is one of the major tenets of modern finance, if not ‘the most fundamental 
valuation principle in finance’.15 This section reviews the mainstream financial analysis of 
arbitrage and shows how arbitrage is a core component of the theory of efficient market 
and of the consequent idea of fair market. In order to do so, it is essential to first locate 
this theory within the project of modern finance.  
 
This project started in the 1950s at the University of Chicago and gave rise to modern 
academic finance. This does not mean that there was no academic interest in finance 
before that time, but that the work done at the University of Chicago provided ‘a 
rigorous theory to a large body of empirical results’.16 The Efficient Market Hypothesis 
(EMH) and the Theory of Arbitrage were among the most prominent results of that 
work. Their most comprehensive enunciation is in the writings of Eugene Fama and 
Milton Friedman. 
 
These scholars were confronted with a problem of resource allocation. Fama writes: ‘The 
primary role of the capital market is allocation of ownership of the economy’s capital 
stock’.17 Given this problem, they theorised how the market could achieve the optimal 
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distribution of that ownership. As Fama writes, ‘the ideal is a market in which prices 
provide accurate signals for resource allocation’, that is, a market in which the price at 
‘any time fully reflects all available information’.18 Fama called such a market ‘efficient’. 
Moreover, because in this situation market signals appear in the same way to each 
individual, an efficient market also becomes a ‘fair’ one. Hence the allocation of the 
economy’s capital stock is optimal. Fama’s definition of efficiency differs from any 
common-sense understanding or previous usage of the word.19 In particular, it is the first 
time that the adjective efficient is used with reference to markets and not to individual 
portfolios20 and that becomes synonymous with optimality in the allocation of societal 
resources.   
 
But which are the conditions that make markets efficient according to Fama? In order 
for markets to be efficient, investors need to be rational, which in the framework of the 
theory means that they look at information concerning fundamental values of financial 
assets in making their investment decisions. The fundamental value of an asset is 
determined by what the asset will earn in the future.21 As much as efficiency, rationality is 
given a specific meaning – that of looking at fundamental values – which cannot be 
reduced to its common-sense usage.  
 
Why is rationality crucial for market efficiency? If investors are rational, they will 
compete to discover all fundamental information on financial assets and by so doing they 
will help information to become immediately incorporated in asset prices. This in turn 
means that prices will only change in response to new information, which is by definition 
unpredictable. If this is the case, price changes are unpredictable too.22 If prices are 
unpredictable, no one has privileged information or a viewpoint from which to make 
investment decisions. This conveys the idea that the market is not only efficient, but also 
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fair. It is an extremely powerful conclusion given that Fama’s problem was the ‘allocation 
of ownership of the economy’s capital stock’.23  
 
More controversial was the proof of whether the theory stood the test of empirical 
evidence. Soon after the publication of Fama’s article in 1970, the EMH was questioned 
on many grounds, especially the rationality assumption. This was also the time when 
much of the work on behaviour finance began.24  
 
Another theory that complements the EMH, however, partly overcomes the problem 
with the rationality assumption. This is when arbitrage starts to matter. Friedman first 
conceptualised it in ‘The Case for Flexible Exchange Rates’, which appeared in his Essays 
in Positive Economics in 1953. In 1965 Fama elaborated the same concept in his article ‘The 
Behaviour of Stock-Market Prices’ published in the Journal of Business.  
 
Whereas in the EMH the precondition for markets to be efficient is that investors are 
rational, the theory of arbitrage says that markets are still efficient even if some investors 
are irrational. Suppose, Fama says, that a noise generating process gets started – e.g. 
investors trade on noise rather than on fundamental news, that is, they act irrationally. 
Suppose also that this process is subject to herding behaviour: these irrational investors 
follow each other and end up trading in the same way. Prices would tend to run well 
above their intrinsic value, that is, to create ‘bubbles’.25 Even in this case, however, the 
end result will still be an efficient market, as irrational investors will be met in the market 
by sophisticated traders (arbitrageurs) who, by acting as market contrarians, offset and 
neutralise price bubbles.26  
 
[I]f there are many sophisticated traders […] they will be able to recognise 
situations where the price of a common stock is beginning to run up above 
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its intrinsic value. Since they expect the price to move eventually back toward 
its intrinsic value, they have an incentive to sell this security or sell it short27  
 
Arbitrageurs are not only perfectly rational and able to recognise the fundamental value 
of an asset, but are also able to correct other investors’ irrationality. By so doing, they will 
earn a net profit for themselves and bring prices in line with their fundamental values. 
Arbitrageurs thus become for the EMH what the invisible hand is for the theory of 
perfect competition.  
 
This concept of arbitrage is central to models such as Sharpe’s Capital Asset Pricing 
Model28 and Ross’s Asset Pricing Theory.29 In these cases, and in much of the subsequent 
literature, arbitrage has been defined more specifically as the simultaneous buying and 
short selling of the same or essentially similar security that trades at different prices in 
two different markets.30 In other words, it has been defined to include only those 
situations in which there is no risk and which entail a sure profit. This paper, however, 
argues that Fama’s example points to a more general characteristic of arbitrageurs: that of 
being able to offset bubbles each time they get created in a noise generating process. As 
it will be explained later, this conceptualisation has a far bigger explanatory and 
legitimating power than the narrower one.  
 
 
2. The behavioural finance approach to arbitrage 
Among the critiques moved to the Efficient Market Hypothesis, behavioural finance is 
certainly the most popular one. Behavioural financial economists question the rationality 
assumption and in particular the assumption that arbitrage can bring prices back to their 
equilibrium level. They formulate the ‘theory of limited arbitrage’ and the ‘theory of 
investor sentiment’ to explain why arbitrageurs might not work as expected to.31  
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The theory of investor sentiment says that investors do not behave rationally but over- or 
under-react to news.32 This noise generating process gives rise to bubbles or momentum 
in market prices. This is no different from the process described by Fama. What is 
different in behavioural finance is that arbitrageurs or sophisticated traders might be 
unwilling to offset this irrational behaviour.  
Suppose that arbitrageurs know “the model”, i.e. exactly the form of 
behaviour that the noise traders follow, and trade with the noise traders to 
take advantage of their misperceptions. Would such arbitrageurs bring the 
price of an asset closer to its fundamental value? At least in principle, it is 
possible that in some situations it pays arbitrageurs to anticipate future noise 
trader demand, and to “jump on the bandwagon” when prices are high 
rather than sell the asset.33  
 
Instead of having an incentive to sell the asset short – as in Fama’s theory – they might 
fuel and increase the noise generating process. Shleifer takes as example the Internet 
bubble of 2000 and many other financial bubbles documented in the history of finance.34 
 
The theory of limited arbitrage says that arbitrageurs might be unable to close price 
discrepancies. This is due to the fact that prices can move in opposite directions to what 
arbitrageurs expect. Whereas the theory of arbitrage assumes that arbitrageurs can buy 
the undervalued of two essentially similar securities and sell short the overvalued one, 
behavioural finance points out that ‘many securities do not have perfect or even good 
substitutes’,35 so that the very idea of two essentially similar securities is in question. If 
securities are not essentially the same, they will be affected by different fundamental news 
or the same news will affect them differently. It might happen that news on the 
overvalued stocks will be particularly good and news on the undervalued stocks will be 
particularly bad, so that prices further diverge from their intrinsic values. In this case 
arbitrageurs will register a net loss instead of a net profit and will not close out price 
discrepancies (interviewed practitioners speak of ‘asymmetric positions’). If both 
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mechanisms – the theory of limited arbitrage and the theory of investor sentiment – are 
active, arbitrageurs are unlikely to perform the role of rational stabilisers foreseen by the 
EMH. In this scenario, markets are no longer expected to be efficient. 
 
 
3. The sociology approach to arbitrage  
The ‘sociology of arbitrage’ owes its name to the work of Donald MacKenzie.36 Like 
behavioural financial economists, MacKenzie questions the capacity of arbitrage to offset 
investors’ irrationality and thus to bring prices back to their equilibrium level. Contrary to 
behavioural finance, however, for MacKenzie the flaws in the arbitrage mechanism lay 
less with psychological motives (responsiveness, conservatism, etc.) than with 
sociological reasons (various forms of social connectivities: e.g. imitation).  
 
His analysis of arbitrage coincides with his departure from the ‘Parsons’ Pact’, that is, the 
belief that the economy is a separate system from the social and that its study is the 
business of economists, not of sociologists.37 He sees arbitrage as defined in neoclassical 
finance as the tool for this separation between economics and sociology: 
 
There is a sense in which arbitrageurs are the border guards, in economic 
practice, of the Parsonian boundary between economics and sociology.38  
 
If indeed arbitrage does not guarantee the efficiency effect, the Parson’s Pact is 
undermined and sociological explanations become quintessential to market outcomes. He 
develops his argument by looking at the case of Long-Term Capital Management 
(LTCM), the hedge fund that went close to bankruptcy in August 1998. Of all the 
explanations of LTCM collapse that have been advanced,39 he opts for a process of a 
more sociological kind: imitation.     
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LTCM’s success led to widespread imitation […], and the imitation led to a 
‘superportfolio’ of partially overlapping arbitrage positions. Sales by some 
holders of the superportfolio moved prices against others, leading to a cascade 
of self-reinforcing adverse price movements.40 
 
McKenzie draws three conclusions from the LTCM case. First, despite the global reach 
of its activity, LTCM evidenced how interactions in financial markets are of a ‘local’41 and 
‘Granovetterian’ nature,42 that is, they are ‘interactions between relatively limited numbers 
of people who are in some sense known to each other’. Second, LTCM evidenced that 
such forms of interactions – imitation, reciprocal monitoring of each other trading 
strategies, etc. – can lead to economic consequences – a liquidity crisis in this case. ‘The 
key risks may be ‘social’ risks from patterns of interaction within the financial markets, 
rather than shocks from the real economy or from events outside the markets’.43 Third, 
and as a consequence of the first two explanations, LTCM showed the inability of 
arbitrage to insulate the economic from the social.  
 
In a response to MacKenzie, Hardie argues that the failure of arbitrage to bring prices 
back to equilibrium very much depends on our definition of it.44 The failure, in other 
words, is a definitional one. Hardie argues that the arbitrage MacKenzie and behavioural 
financial economists refer to (‘what the real world defines as arbitrage’,45) is not really 
arbitrage. He proposes to narrow its definition to include only those trades that involve 
no risk and have a guaranteed profit.46 This narrower definition – which goes back to 
Ross’s theory as reported above – ‘still serves the role of arbitrage in financial economics, 
in closing mispricing between assets’.47 As for what is commonly – and according to 
Hardie – wrongly termed arbitrage, Hardie argues that it should be treated like most 
other investor activity: they both work according to the sociological processes (e.g. 
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imitation) evidenced by MacKenzie. If properly defined, arbitrageurs can still be the 
border guards of the Parsonian Pact.  
 
 
4. A political economy approach to arbitrage  
Investors’ behaviour – how they think and consequently trade – is central to all the 
approaches to arbitrage analysed so far. Neoclassical finance sees investors’ – and 
especially arbitrageurs’ – rationality as the critical assumption in the theory of efficient 
markets. Behavioural finance sees investors’ psychological motives/irrationality as the 
crucial reason to reject the efficiency paradigm, especially since arbitrageurs might not be 
willing to behave as the theory expects them to. In MacKenzie’s sociology of arbitrage, 
sociological processes such as imitation prevent the achievement of efficiency and more 
generally prevent the economy from remaining insulated from the social. Someone might 
expect that a political economy approach to arbitrage will identify the political processes 
that influence the behaviour of investors and prevent them from preserving the 
efficiency of the market. Indeed such an approach already exists within mainstream 
finance. According to mainstream approaches in finance, in fact, the process of price 
formation can be inefficient because of regulatory and legal constraints. These 
constraints prevent investors from driving prices back to their equilibrium level. (This is 
for instance the argument of the ‘Coasians’, who interpret the Coase theorem to signify 
that government actions, including regulation, cannot produce a better result than relying 
on negotiations between individuals in the market.48)  
 
This is not, however, the main purpose of this article, though the focus is still on 
regulatory policies and attitude. The political economy approach proposed in this article 
shifts the focus away from investors’ rationality and towards the interests that revolves 
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around the practice of arbitrage. The efficiency-argument is still crucial, since it has 
influenced the work of regulators and legislators alike and has informed the debate 
between those who benefit and those who claim to lose from arbitrage. Yet the article 
aims at looking not at the efficiency hypothesis per se, but rather at its impact on and 
interrelations with the practice of financial regulation. 
 
Before proceeding with the analysis, however, it is important to emphasise once again 
what is meant by arbitrage in this context and why it differs from the approaches 
analysed so far. Hardie rightly points out that the definition of arbitrage is crucial for its 
conceptualization.49 While he advocates for a narrower and more ‘purist’ definition 
according to which arbitrage is still able to perform its efficiency-enhancing role, this 
paper argues for a rather opposite position. ‘Real world’ understanding of arbitrage 
includes a variety of mechanisms and instruments that are perceived to be able to offset a 
price bubble thanks to superior technique or knowledge, independently of whether they 
are risk-free or profit-guaranteed. Fama wrote in his example that if the price of a stock 
runs above its intrinsic value, sophisticated traders have an incentive to sell this stock 
short, offsetting irrational behaviour and bringing efficiency back to the market.50 This 
paper argues that in regulatory and policy circles short selling is attributed the same 
efficiency-enhancing role that is commonly ascribed to arbitrage. In addition to shifting 
the focus away from investors’ behaviour and towards their interests, this article stresses 
the need to look more specifically at the practice of short selling. 
 
More specifically, the article looks at the way short selling is allowed to operate in the 
market and the role of the efficiency explanation within this. Regulatory decisions and 
non-decisions determine whether a strategy is permitted and the range of choices open to 
investors. This article shows that even if the performativity of the EMH has been 
 17
questioned in both theoretical analyses and empirical tests, its power to legitimise regulatory 
and market practice is as strong as ever.51 Besides, this legitimisation is not without 
consequences for the distribution of gains and losses from the practice of short selling. 
These aspects will be analysed through a series of market events of the recent financial 
history and, as a particular case study, in relation to the reform of the short-sale rule in 
US equity markets.  
 
The role of short selling has been increasingly debated. On the one hand, short selling is 
said to be able to offset price bubbles and push prices towards their equilibrium level 
(Fama’s argument). In particular, it is said to perform three positive functions: to 
incorporate information into prices thus making the process of price formation more 
efficient; to provide liquidity;52 and, in the case of derivatives arbitrage, to keep 
derivatives linked to the cash market.53 On the other hand, short selling played a dubious 
role in many events of the recent financial history – e.g. speculative pressures in the 
aftermath of 9/11; naked short selling abuses. More generally, short selling is said to be 
able to exaggerate share price declines through the use of manipulative strategies; to 
exacerbate a bear market; and to increase share price volatility. The argument of the 
benign role of short selling is dominant throughout the financial community – 
practitioners, academics and regulators alike. This explains why any call for its regulation 
is measured against the possibility of hindering its efficiency-enhancing role. The 
argument of the manipulative role of short selling is voiced by long-term shareholders 
and issuers, especially small capitalization companies, which fear the aggressive practices 
of short sellers – e.g. the practice of spreading negative information about a company to 
push its stock price down. It is true that in principle nobody is in favour of manipulative 
short selling and that manipulation is condemned as an aberration of an otherwise 
optimal strategy. Yet the distinction of what is manipulative and what is not is hard to 
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maintain. In addition, manipulative short selling has been on the increase and in many 
markets it has been the rule and not the exception/aberration. The various interests 
linked to the practice of short selling are at the centre of this paper and will be examined 
in the remainder of the section. Before doing so, however, it is essential to understand 
who is selling short and the relevance of this mode of trading. 
 
 To begin with, there is a lack of data on short selling. Short and long positions in equity 
markets are not subject to the same disclosure requirements. In the UK, for instance, 
anyone buying more than 3 percent of the shares of a company is required to disclose,54 
but this does not apply if someone is selling short more than 3 percent of the same 
shares. Similarly, if these transactions are carried out through put options, which are the 
economic equivalent of short selling, they are not subject to any disclosure requirement, 
while call options (the buying side) are. In the U.S., short selling in cash equity markets – 
in terms of aggregate short position in a share – is reported, but this leaves out short 
selling carried out through derivatives markets, which is the bulk of it. In addition, the 
identity of those who sell short remains unknown. Regulators estimate that most of the 
short selling is done by hedge funds (through market makers) or similar vehicles.55 This 
can partially answer the question of the relevance of this practice in financial markets: the 
growing importance of short selling is directly proportional to the huge amounts of 
money flowing into the hedge fund industry – an industry which passed from 300 billion 
in capital under management in 1998 to 1 trillion in 2005.56  
 
In the last decade the benign role of short selling was mentioned many times during 
currency crises, especially when the currency was said to be pegged in an unsustainable 
way (currency was overvalued) and shorting it was seen as a way to bring it back to its 
fundamental value. In equity markets, it was the Internet bubble that brought short 
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selling to the headlines. In 2000, when the internet bubble burst, one of the reasons for 
the hyper-inflated valuations of dot.com companies was said to be the lack of 
mechanisms to sell short or the existence of constraints in the use of short selling. 
Legislation such as the Commodity Futures Modernization Act (CFMA) of 2000, which 
re-introduced single-stock futures (a way to sell stocks short) into the US system, was 
welcomed as a way to make short selling easier and cheaper.57 Most of the Finance 
literature on the topic focuses on the constraints to short selling that prevents it from 
performing its efficiency-enhancing role.58 Once again the concept of arbitrage is further 
extended: it is not only arbitrageurs that bring efficiency by spotting price discrepancies, 
but every tool of short selling can counterbalance the mass of investors that buy long, 
thus becoming efficiency-enhancing.  
 
Alongside this positive attitude towards short selling, several market events brought up 
other aspects of the practice and questioned its benign character. Short selling became 
particularly contested in the aftermath of 9/11. After the terrorist attacks of 9/11, both 
the financial and non-specialised press repeatedly reported news of hedge funds 
‘profiteering’59 from the terrorist attacks and especially from the collapse in the share 
prices of airlines and insurance companies. The activity of shorting the market was 
identified as being to blame. Emphasis was placed on the gains hedge funds and short 
sellers in general could make by selling short the stocks of airline and insurance 
companies.60 ‘A typical hedge fund short selling transaction would net “tens of millions 
of dollars” in profit on a trade that could be valued at hundreds of millions of dollars’.61 
The Wall Street Journal reported that Pequot Capital Management, one of the biggest 
hedge funds in the US, ‘in the seven trading days since the market reopened […] made a 
profit of about $700 million […]’.62  
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Discussions followed on the effect and desirability of short selling and calls were made to 
restrict this practice. Since in order to sell short hedge funds need to borrow stocks from 
institutional investors or banks, one proposal was to stop or limit the lending of stocks to 
hedge funds for speculative purposes. It is interesting to analyse the reasons that were 
given to defend the practice. A hedge fund manager said, ‘[Banning short selling] would 
be foolish. It would be taking out a standard and useful practice, which keeps markets 
efficient. It’s our job to make the markets more efficient’.63 This view was sustained not 
only in the hedge fund industry, but also among regulators. Regulators in both London 
and Washington stated that they felt no need to intervene, considering short selling to be 
beneficial to the market.64 Howard Davies, former Chairman of the Financial Services 
Authority (FSA) in London, said that monetary authorities had no intention to somehow 
limit the use of short selling and the lending of stocks to short sellers. He said: ‘In normal 
circumstances short selling is a natural and important feature of the market. Many would 
argue it improves “price discovery”’.65 
 
Short selling was also addressed at the Financial Stability Forum in 2002.66 The FSF felt 
compelled to debate the issue after the allegations of massive short selling in the 
aftermath of September 11 and in the Japanese stock market in the spring of 2002. The 
FSF report concluded that these allegations were not verified.67 FSF members found that 
short selling was on average providing a useful service to the market and that any attempt 
to regulate it would have been counterproductive. In this context short selling was also 
targeted for its role in foreign exchange markets. (Short selling in foreign exchange 
markets means selling a currency short in the expectation of its devaluation.) If regulation 
of short selling is scant in securities markets, the situation is even worse in currency 
markets, where no data on either short or long positions taken by market participants is 
available. Indeed some discussions on disclosing short selling in foreign exchange 
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markets did take place in Basel, but no decision was taken. The debate also revealed 
divisions among countries. German and French regulators were much more inclined to 
regulate it than the UK and US ones. In 2002 Hans Eichel – Germany's finance minister 
– proposed banning short-selling in times of crisis.68 UK and US regulators instead 
defended the practice. Howard Davies, at the time Chairman of the Financial Services 
Authority (FSA), showed at best scepticism about any attempt to regulate short selling, a 
practice – he says – that   
Is a normal activity, which, indeed, has some pluses associated with it in terms 
of speeding the necessary process of price adjustment. There are those, notably 
in Japan and Germany who want to control short-selling directly. Good luck to 
them. But a financial centre like London which prides itself on its openness and 
flexibility should think long and hard before imposing such restrictions. […] I 
hope that at the FSA we can hold the line and not be pushed into more 
restrictive measures […].69  
 
The Economist and the financial press in general have been sanguine too in defending short 
selling against any possible regulation. When in 2003 Eliot Spitzer, New York state's 
attorney-general, included short-selling in its campaign against Wall Street, The Economist 
did not only take the view that ‘in bull markets short-sellers can help to put a brake on 
irrational exuberance’, but also that ‘those who call for restrictions are often trying to run 
companies in trouble, or entire economies that are on the ropes’. This was like saying 
that companies or countries calling for a regulation of short selling have something to 
hide. ‘Last year, Hans Eichel, Germany's finance minister, proposed banning short-selling 
in times of crisis. In 2002 the German stock market fell by 44%’.70  
 
These examples show how the efficiency-role of short selling is endorsed by regulators, 
practitioners and market observers in major financial centres. They also show, however, 
that agreement is not universal and that a divide can be spotted between those against 
any regulation of short selling and those in favour of some control and restrictions. The 
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focus on a specific instance of short selling regulation – regulation SHO in the US – will 
allow completion of the political economy analysis by highlighting the interests that are 
attached to each claim. Which interest do short sellers represent? Are those willing to 
limit the practice of short selling promoting an inefficient market? 
 
The short sale rule in US equity markets was originally formulated in 1938s at a time 
when the impact of short selling was far from being seen as benign. In the late 1930s-
early 1940s many in the US blamed the 1929 stock market crash on the strategy of selling 
securities short in an attempt to drive down their price. It was indeed a core issue in the 
post-Depression debate that brought about the reform of the investment companies and 
securities laws in the US (Investment Company Act of 1940, Securities Act of 1933, and 
Securities Exchange Act of 1934).71 Congress delegated authority to regulate short selling 
to the Securities and Exchange Commission.72 The SEC issued a rule that was going to 
restrict the short sales of any security registered on a national securities exchange in the 
US (Rule 10a-1 or up-tick rule). Rule 10a-1 allowed selling short a listed security only ‘at a 
price above the price at which the immediately preceding sale was realized (plus tick) or 
at the last sale price if it is higher than the last different price (zero plus tick)’73.74 Beyond 
the technical jargon, this provision precluded short sales of a listed security at 
successively lower prices so as to prevent investors from driving down the market.  
 
The debate in Congress and at the SEC, however, did not stop there. In 1963 Congress 
required the SEC to carry out a study of the relationships between changes in short 
positions and subsequent price trend.75 The request of such a study suggests that 
Congress was concerned that the up-tick rule might not stop the process of price 
manipulation for which it was designed. In effect the study proved that ‘the ratio of short 
sales to total volume increases in a declining market’,76 which means that a downward 
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trend could be triggered despite the up-tick rule. In 1976 the SEC proposed the 
elimination of the up-tick rule, but market participants, including the major exchanges, 
NYSE and AMEX,77 strongly opposed the suspension of the up-tick rule, arguing that it 
provided important protection for investors that should not be removed. In 1991, the 
House Committee on Government Operations released a report on short selling that 
once more questioned the effectiveness of the up-tick rule and asked whether a similar 
rule should be implemented for NASDAQ trading. Following this report, the NASD 
proposed a short sale rule covering NASDAQ National Market System (NMS) securities, 
which are those securities that have similar characteristics to listed securities but are 
traded on the NASDAQ. The SEC approved this rule (Rule 3350) in 1994.78  
 
No further changes to this regime were implemented until 1999, when the SEC started a 
process of revision. By 1999, many things had changed in the market. Transactions in 
listed securities now represent only a small fraction of equity trading. The bulk of short 
selling is executed in over-the-counter markets and through derivatives – none of which 
is subject to short sale restrictions (e.g. no short sale rule applies to futures exchanges). In 
addition, the Commodity Futures Modernization Act of 2000 (CFMA 2000) re-
introduced into the US market single-stock futures (SSF), which are a fast, cheap and 
easy way to conduct short selling in futures exchanges. Single-stock futures – contracts 
by which one part promises future delivery of an asset to another – allow selling stocks 
more easily than by going to the cash market because instead of having to borrow the 
stocks to sell short it is enough to sell a SSF contract. Those willing to sell short can 
move to futures markets, where no up-tick rule is in place. Last but not least, the US 
moved from a fractional to a decimal system for pricing securities. While in a fractional 
system it made sense to say that short sales could not be executed at a price lower by a 
fraction than the preceding one, in a decimal system the difference can be so small (e.g. 
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0.00000001) that it is no longer a problem to wait – actually it is possible to manipulate 
stocks so that they move to the threshold price quicker. These events lessened the 
rationale of the up-tick rule (as currently formulated).  
 
On the other hand, a series of abuses linked to short selling caused many in the financial 
community to call for more and not less regulation. The most often reported abuses are 
the so-called ‘bear-raid’, ‘short selling at the box’ and ‘naked short selling’. In a bear-raid 
short selling is done in an effort to drive down the price of an asset. A variation of this 
strategy is short selling at the box, where traders first ride the price of the stock up in a 
boxed position and, when they think the upward trend is about to turn, start selling 
short. With the help of negative comments on the company posted on the internet, they 
drive the price of the stock down to buy it back cheaply. In the practice of naked short 
selling, shares are sold short without any arrangement or intention to borrow the stocks 
for delivery by settlement date. In legal terms this means shorting without an ‘affirmative 
determination’ of the existence of the shares to short against (sources close to the SEC, 
2004). With this practice market makers sell short more shares than are actually issued by 
the company, which has consequences for both parties. By artificially inflating the 
number of shares in the market, this practice has the effect of diluting the price value of 
current shareholders. By diluting the value of the stock, affected companies will find it 
more expensive to raise capital. In addition, brokers can lend shares for shorting without 
the prior consent of the shareholder. Suppose someone owns shares in a broker account. 
The brokers are allowed to lend those shares to someone else for the purpose of selling 
them short. The shareholders will have their value diluted due to a short selling activity 
carried out with their very own shares. All these abuses were reported in the comment 
letters sent to the SEC during its process of consultation.79  
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The SEC concluded the process of consultation and came up with a new rule in June 
2004 (reg. SHO). But before analysing the SEC final rule, it is useful to go through the 
period of consultation and show how contested the issue was and the nature of the 
opposing interests. The SEC opened the consultation process in 1999 asking comments 
on whether the up-tick rule should be reformed, abolished or maintained.80 The opening 
sentences of the concept release recognise the role of arbitrage: 
Arbitrageurs contribute to pricing efficiency by utilizing short sales to profit 
from price discrepancies […].81 
 
This type of arbitrage was already exempted from any regulation in Rule 10a-1. The SEC, 
however, makes the same comments about short selling tout court:  
Short selling can also contribute to the pricing efficiency of the equities 
markets. When a short seller speculates on a downward movement in a 
security, his transaction is a mirror image of the person who purchases the 
security based upon speculation that the security’s price will rise. Such short 
sellers add to stock pricing efficiency because their transactions inform the 
market of their evaluation of future stock price performance.82 
 
Reference to the efficient market hypothesis and to the role that short sellers play in 
contributing to market liquidity and pricing efficiency is also made in many comment 
letters. These letters can be grouped into three categories: (a) letters calling for the 
elimination of any restriction on short selling; (b) letters in favour of maintaining or 
improving upon the current rule on short sales; (c) letters calling for more stringent 
short-sale regulation – particularly in those markets where small-capitalization stocks 
trade – in order to guard against short sale abuses.83   
 
Type A letters were sent especially by brokers/dealers (e.g. Charles Schwab, Cornerstone 
Securities, Hill Thompson) and associations of hedge funds (Managed Funds 
Association). They stress ‘the important role that short sellers have traditionally played in 
the market by contributing to both market liquidity and pricing efficiency’84  and that any 
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rule on short selling – in whatever market – greatly diminishes this positive contribution. 
‘The existence of the short sale rule introduces pricing inefficiencies’.85 ‘There is nothing 
wrong with the practice of sort selling because it may enhance market liquidity’.86 Of 
course all these letters are against the use of short selling as a manipulative device, but 
they see manipulation as an aberration, which should not shed any negative light on the 
overall practice.  
 
A few words are needed to analyse the interests that these letters reflect. The interest of 
hedge funds is fairly straightforward: hedge funds are major short sellers and legally the 
ones with the highest capacity to sell short. As for brokers/dealers, they make large 
profits from servicing the hedge fund industry and providing them with the instruments 
to sell short. In order to sell short, in fact, investors need to first borrow the securities 
from a broker/dealer, who will earn an interest on the proceeds of the short selling, 
trading and clearing commissions, and possibly income from derivative transactions.87 
The more unrestricted short selling is the more investors short and the higher the fees 
and commissions for the brokers are.  
 
Most type B letter were sent by: (1) major national stock exchanges, such as the New 
York Stock Exchange (NYSE) and the Boston Stock Exchange (BSE); by self-regulatory 
organizations such as the National Association of Securities Dealers (NASD), which 
watches over the NASDAQ exchange;88 by voluntary associations such as the 
Association of Publicly Traded Companies (APTC) and the North America Securities 
Administrators Association (NAASA). They were all in favour of retaining the short-sale 
rule or improving upon it. NASD pointed out that today’s markets are ‘just as vulnerable 
to bear raids and piling on as they were at the inception of the Rule’.89 No ‘empirical data 
exists that would change the need for short sale regulation since 1938 when the rule was 
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adopted’.90 NYSE argued that the up-tick rule still serves to protect individual investors, 
prevent fraud and manipulation, and promotes just and equitable principles of trade’.91 
The mission of some of these organizations is to protect investors (e.g. NAASA) or 
represent the interests of issuers (e.g. APTC), so that their view can be seen as 
representative of a larger group of market actors. Corporate and long-term investors in 
particular are concerned with ‘short sellers depleting the value of their securities’.92 Even 
if they recognise that theoretically short selling can bring efficiency and liquidity to the 
market, they see short sellers as aggressively trying to find and spread negative 
information on their stocks in order to push (and keep) the price down. In this type of 
letter, the efficiency-enhancing role of short selling is not the primary consideration. 
Focus is on the protection of issuers’ and shareholders’ rights, which is partly seen in 
opposition to those of short sellers.   
 
Most type C letters were sent by small capitalization companies, also called ‘penny 
stocks’, or by their shareholders. These are stocks traded in the NASDAQ Smallcap, 
OTC:BB, or Pink Sheets markets.93 Type C letters advocate the extension of short sale 
regulation to these markets, where most short sale abuses have been reported (most of 
the lawsuits involve these stocks; none involved NYSE stocks) and where no rule on 
short selling has ever been implemented. They argue that the lack of regulation of short 
selling in the OTC:BB, Pink Sheet and SmallCap markets produces high level of volatility 
in stock prices. For instance, Edwin Marshall, Chairman and CEO of Medizone 
International,94 said that the price of his company’s shares were recursively distorted and 
manipulated by short sellers. According to Marshall’s account,  
On the 11th of June 2001 Medizone opened at $0.39. The stock then rose 
from the previous close of $0.38 to $0.47 in the first 12 minutes of trading. 
On heavy buy volume the market makers then walked the stock down to $0.28 
over the next few hours. They short sold the stock down about 40% in two 
hours on heavy buying! One market maker would not be capable of that kind 
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of play. In my opinion, there has to be manipulation and collusion…  The 
basic law of supply and demand was circumvented.95 
 
Small capitalisation companies with a high degree of vulnerability – that is, high risk of 
failure – are short sellers’ favourite target. Short sellers can bet against these companies’ 
stocks and even push them into bankruptcy. Once bankruptcy is declared, short sales will 
be automatically covered, so that this will sort out even the delivery problem. Mr 
Marshall refers to ‘market makers’, which are mainly brokers/dealers acting for their own 
and their clients’ (especially hedge funds) accounts. Market makers are supposed to 
maintain an orderly market by ‘acting as the counterweight to public exuberance, helping 
to temper volatile price rises and subsequent drops’,96 like the sophisticated traders in 
Fama’s example. This might be true in many cases, but, given the number of complaints 
received on this issue – type C was the largest group of letters, accounting for over 2000 
of the comments received by the SEC97 – it can be concluded that sophisticated traders 
are not always doing their job of bringing prices back to their equilibrium level. They are 
often manipulating the market. Type C letters reported several cases of abuses (naked 
short selling, bear raid, short selling at the box). In these letters the very concept of short 
sale is often seen as immoral and unethical and its efficiency-enhancing role rarely 
mentioned (‘it remains a bastion of immorality in the market’;98 ‘It is not fair’;99 ‘Unfair 
advantage of powerful short selling by large institutions’;100 ‘The concept of short selling 
is abominable’;101 ‘The lack of regulation encourages criminal activity by the market 
makers’102).103  
 
The first consideration that can be made by looking at the three groups of comment 
letters is that there is a divide along the corporate/finance axis. Firms are worried that 
manipulative short selling can curtail the value of their stocks, which in turn would 
hinder their capacity to raise fund. For them the efficiency argument is less compelling, 
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especially if short selling is done in an aggressive way to keep prices artificially low. Short 
sellers and market makers instead claim that restrictions on short selling cause stock 
prices to inflate – in other words, they claim that restrictions cause an ‘upward 
manipulation’ – and draw on the efficiency-argument to back their claim. The conflict 
between short sellers and corporate actors is becoming increasingly fierce. One 
emblematic case is that of Patrick Byrne, CEO of Overstock.com, which has initiated a 
real battle against naked short selling, especially against failures to deliver the shares sold 
short.104 Mr Byrne argues that these failures to deliver reduce many stocks to ‘penny 
stocks’ (i.e. each stock is worth less than a dollar) and open the way to their bankruptcy. 
Large institutional investors in fact never invest in penny stocks, so that the demand for 
these stocks after they have been shorted never recovers. On the other hand, the 
literature has started documented instances in which it is companies that – sometimes as 
a reaction to short-sale abuses – use a variety of methods to indirectly self-restrict short 
selling and create a short sale squeeze.105 
 
A second divide can be traced along the line of long/short positions: shareholders that 
buy stocks to keep (which are therefore ‘long’) have different interests than short-sellers, 
who, most of the time, do not even own the stocks. The nature of the conflict is evident 
if we start from the simple consideration that when prices go up, long-holders gain and 
short sellers lose money, while when prices go down long-holders lose and short sellers 
gain. Short sellers blame long-holders of ‘upward manipulation’ (creating a price bubble), 
while long-holders blame short sellers of ‘downward manipulation’ (depressing prices by 
aggressively shorting stocks). In favour of short sellers it was a chorus of commentators 
during the Internet boom who pointed to short selling as a remedy against the 
excessively-inflated buying side. In favour of long-term shareholders two considerations 
are usually made. The first is that downward manipulation is executed by very 
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sophisticated traders who are not only able to drive prices down but also to keep them 
down for long period of time. Sometimes the imbalance between long and short 
positions is such – short positions are much larger – that it discourages people from 
buying, as it would take them too much capital to raise the price. The second 
consideration is that the downward and upward manipulation might be initiated by the 
same category of investors, so that one single instance of manipulation is taking place. In 
the case of the so-called ‘bandwagon effect’, for instance, sophisticated investors drive 
the price of stocks up only to short them when prices are high enough to allow them a 
profit. After all, if short selling is supposed to offset price bubbles, where were short 
sellers during the mounting of the Internet bubble? The conflict, therefore, can be re-cast 
as one between sophisticated traders/short sellers on the one hand and the mass of 
ordinary investors on the other. 
 
The final consideration is that small firms are more likely to suffer from the activities of 
short sellers than large ones. It is unlikely that short sellers attack a stock like Microsoft. 
Indeed very few comment letters were received from large issuers. Most of the 
complaints came from small capitalization companies or, more generally, from those 
companies whose vulnerability is higher. As said before, short sellers have a particular 
preference for vulnerable companies running risky businesses. The example of Medizone 
International is very appropriate: pharmaceutical companies producing new drugs or 
vaccines are considered at high risk of failures and more likely to be attacked by short 
sellers.  
 
Given this set of preferences for the regulation/non-regulation of short selling, what did 
the SEC do in the end? Which set of interests – if any – prevailed in finalising Regulation 
SHO? Once again it is to be said that Regulation SHO is for a good part invalidated by 
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the fact that other instruments of short selling are abundantly present in the market (e.g. 
single-stock futures), so that whichever conclusion the SEC reaches it will not change the 
situation in any fundamental way. After more than five years of consultation, the SEC 
issued a final rule in June 2004. It thought of reaching a compromise by tackling the 
abuses while at the same time freeing short selling of the up-tick rule. The SEC 
Economic Analysis Department thought that, especially because of the introduction of 
the decimalisation system, the up-tick rule was ineffective in preventing attempts to drive 
down the market (bear raids or ‘death spirals’) and that it could be lifted without major 
consequences. To be sure of it, the SEC decided to have a pilot period in which the up-
tick rule would be suspended for about 40 percent of listed stocks and 40 percent of 
NASDAQ NMS stocks (plus some stocks in small-caps and OTC:BB markets).106 The 
pilot will be used as a study to assess the general usefulness of the up-tick rule. After one 
year (the pilot started in May 2005), a decision will be taken to either suspend the rule 
(most likely event) or reform it otherwise.  
 
The SEC decided to concentrate its efforts on tackling abuses and separating the 
aberration from the benign, efficiency-enhancing practice. In this respect it decided to 
enforce two rules: a ‘locate’ requirement and a ‘delivery’ requirement. First, it established 
a ‘locate requirement’ for everyone willing to sell short, so as to prevent naked-short 
selling. If a trader wants to sell short a number of shares, they must first be located: this 
means that, although the trader does not have to borrow them straight away, an 
arrangement must be made to do it in due time (which is called ‘affirmative 
determination’). An exception was made for market makers and sophisticated traders for 
what is called ‘bona fide’ short selling. Bona fide short selling refers to those trades that 
are meant to provide liquidity – bona fide hedging – and do not have any speculative or 
investment purpose. The rationale of this exception is to maintain the capacity of short 
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selling to bring liquidity and efficiency to the market. Yet the exception provides a potential 
loophole, since it will not be terribly easy to distinguish bona fide from other types of 
short selling executed by the same broker/dealer.107 Another potential loophole in the 
‘locate’ requirement concerns international arbitrage. For instance, an investor might say 
that short positions are covered with stocks soon to be delivered from a foreign stock 
exchange. Other jurisdictions, however, might not have any restriction against short 
selling, not even naked short selling. This is the case of Canada. Brokers and investors 
can sell short through Canadian institutions that sell into the US markets. It is clear that 
this might give rise to another potential loophole.  
 
The second action the SEC took is a mandatory requirement to stop selling short and 
close positions for all those securities that do not settle within 13 days from the trading 
day and that represent more than 0.5 percent of the total outstanding shares issued by the 
company (‘close out rule’).108 These are called ‘threshold securities’ and Reg. SHO 
requires self-regulatory organizations (SROs) such as NYSE, NASDAQ, AMEX to 
disseminate a daily list of threshold securities.109 Until securities are in the list, they cannot 
be sold short without first borrowing the shares. Yet market observers noticed that since 
the publication of the lists on 3 January 2005 many securities have been in the threshold 
list for well beyond 13 consecutive days. Sometimes they stay for months or forever. This 
can be explained by the possibility for short sellers to cover a short sale opened with one 
broker by taking another one with a different broker. Reg. SHO prohibits such 
behaviour, but the evidence from one year of threshold listing shows that the prohibition 
can be evaded. In addition, threshold lists can only be made for securities of reporting 
companies, that is, companies that are registered with the SEC. Companies in the Pink 
Sheets,110 which are highly affected by short sale abuses, are not registered with the SEC 
– hence their securities cannot be threshold securities. Finally, the close-out rule does not 
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apply to open fail positions that existed prior to the effective date of Regulation SHO (3 
January 2005).111 This way of grandfathering the existing ‘fails-to-deliver’ (FTD) might 
leave the abuses unpunished and, if there has been any damage to the shorted stocks, 
perpetuate the damage.  
 
Overall, however, the problem seems to be one of enforcement rather than introduction 
of new rules. As many commentators pointed out, Reg. SHO does not add anything new 
to the current legal system: rules against market manipulation already existed in the US 
system. The problem was that the SEC was not able to enforce them.112 Even with Reg. 
SHO it is not clear which kind of enforcement mechanisms are in place and how strict 
the ‘punishment’ for not complying with the ‘locate’ and ‘delivery’ requirements is. The 
persistence of threshold securities says that enforcement and sanctioning mechanisms are 
not working and this furthers the impression that the distinction between benign and 
manipulative short selling is not straightforward.  
 
The persistence of threshold securities also triggered further complaints against the 
working of the SEC. By not enforcing the rules and not sanctioning the abuses, critics 
say, many investors and issuers were placed at a disadvantaged position in relation to 
other market actors, notably broker/dealers. In addition, critics reckon that the failures to 
deliver are of considerable size and might lead to a systemic meltdown and a financial 
crisis of large proportions. Conversely, SEC officers reply that these claims are 
exaggerated. They argue that many of the complaints come from issuers whose 
management practices are equally obscure and therefore deserve to have their stocks 
shorted. Or they argue that those complaining against short selling abuses are ‘paranoids 
and lunatics’, who blow it all out of proportion and make up unrealistic conspiracy 
theories. In both cases the SEC is reluctant to accept that naked short selling and 
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strategic failures-to-deliver are as endemic as complainers report. But behind these 
motivations it is possible to spot once again the influence of the efficiency argument: 
short selling penalizes those stocks that are overpriced and those complaining have 
something to hide that short sellers can reveal for the benefit of the whole market.  
 
It is undeniable that the SEC is faced with a dilemma. As a source close to the SEC said, 
on the one hand SEC officials do not want to restrain something that is ‘a tool of 
efficiency’, but on the other hand they know that many players (e.g. hedge funds) can use 
it for manipulation purposes. The dilemma SEC regulators face needs to be 
contextualised in an environment where a more positive attitude towards short selling 
(‘more positive’ with reference to the post-Depression years) has come to dominate 
market practice. This environment was described at the beginning of this section, with 
the reintroduction of single-stock futures and regulators’ rejection of the need to restrict 
short selling after 9/11 and other episodes of market unrest (example of The Economist). 
The efficiency-argument was implicitly or explicitly at the centre of all these decisions 
and opinions. Other developments can be brought to bear. For instance, US regulators 
relaxed some of the rules that limited the use of short selling by mutual and pension 
funds. One of these rules was the so-called ‘short short rule’ or ‘30 percent test’ and 
required that mutual funds derived less than 30 percent of their gross income from the 
sale of securities held for less than three months and from the use of short term 
strategies in general if they wanted to qualify as Regulated Investment Companies 
(RIC).113 Once qualified for RIC treatment, they could avoid corporate taxation. So the 
trade off was between a more liberal regime in the use of derivatives and leverage and a 
more accommodating tax regime. This ceased to be a trade-off in 1997, when the 106th 
Congress passed the ‘Taxpayer Relief Act’, which, among other things, repealed Section 
851(b)(3) (the ‘short-short rule’) of the Internal Revenue Code. One of the consequences 
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of the repeal of this provision was that it allowed mutual funds to include short selling in 
their trading strategies without them losing their tax exemption.114 In other words, 
taxation has become more ‘short selling-friendly’. Another example can be found in the 
way short selling has come to be portrayed by online pundits. As the manager of a 
financial boutique observed, the tone of most articles on short selling is pedantically 
didactical. He said: ‘It seems to me that commentators want to inform investors that 
there is a new way of playing the market – shorting it – and that this is a normal, positive 
development and perhaps the only smart way to play the market’.115 In all these examples 
the emphasis on the profitability of short selling is backed and reinforced by the positive 
role short selling is said to play in keeping a market efficient. 
 
All these trends reinforce and at the same time are reinforced by the legacy of the EMH. 
This section showed that this legacy is still very strong, despite the fact that its 
explanatory power has been questioned by different strands of the finance literature (e.g. 
behavioural finance, the sociology of arbitrage). Although the performativity of the EMH 
is far from perfect, as MacKenzie points out, its power to legitimate market practices and 
regulatory regimes is still very strong. This legitimating power is not without 
consequences for the distribution of gains from trading and investing. As the process 
leading to Regulation SHO showed, different categories of market actors are affected by 
short selling in different ways.  Hence any regulatory initiative is likely to benefit certain 
categories of investors at the expenses of others. The efficiency-argument of short selling 
seems to be the key concept around which the various claims revolve.  
 
This article provides a first attempt to conceptualise short selling in a political economy 
perspective. Additional research is warranted to understand the gains and losses from this 
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practice and to which extent a redistribution of wealth from long holder to short sellers is 
taking place.  
 
Concluding remarks 
In neoclassical finance, markets are not only efficient but fair. They do not admit the 
possibility of conflicting social welfares since the ethical properties attributed to markets 
treat all players equally. Arbitrage and short selling are interesting features of the fair and 
efficient market and offer particular insights into the arguments surrounding the concept. 
This paper has shown that conflicting social welfares exist and that a practice like short 
selling – generally described as useful and efficiency-enhancing – is perceived differently 
by corporate actors, traders, and small businesses.  
 
Finance’s justification of short selling as efficiency-enhancing seems to be the key 
concept around which different claims revolve. Regulators do not want to restrain 
something that is ‘a tool of efficiency’, but on the other hand they know that many 
players (e.g. hedge funds) can use short selling for manipulative purposes. The 
compromise is usually achieved by tackling the abuses as if they were isolated aberrations 
from an otherwise optimal behaviour. However, the distinction between an aberration on 
the one hand, and normal and efficient behaviour on the other, is problematic, as the 
loopholes in Regulation SHO demonstrate. 
 
More generally, the efficiency justification of short selling produces a divide along the 
lines of corporate/finance and long/short holders of capital. More research is warranted 
on the gains and losses from the practice of short selling for different categories of 
investors. Contrary to the dominant view in neo-classical finance, no financial practice is 
positive or negative in absolute terms but only in relative terms. There are always social 
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conflicts surrounding market practices and a political economy approach can help 
understand them by mapping ‘who gets what’ and bringing in the political, contested, 
nature of their management and regulation.
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